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 Abstract 
The report examines the extent to which the United States market for tradable 
pollution permits has been an efficient way to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions from coal-
burning power plants. To do so, this report first provides background information on the 
effects of SO2 emissions on the environment in the United States. It discusses the initial 
attempt with the 1970 Clean Air Act to reduce these emissions and its degree of success. 
The details of the 1990 Amendments are then given. The economic theory behind the 
different methods of pollution control (quantity regulation, technology mandate, taxation, 
and emissions restriction through tradable permits) is explained and their efficiency 
regarding consumer and producer surplus is contrasted. The report then reviews 
published articles regarding the topic at hand.  The U.S. Acid Rain Program has been 
found to be very efficient in its ability to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions at a low cost to 
the producers. 
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1. Introduction 
Protecting the environment is much more of a concern to society than it has been 
in the past. This is largely due to the discovery of the harmful effects of pollutants. More 
and more people are “going green” by recycling, driving more fuel efficient cars, using 
compact fluorescent light bulbs, for example. Governments around the world have 
attempted to reduce pollution through a range of means in various industries. This report 
focuses on the United States’ experience with the sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions 
reduction as part of the U.S. Acid Rain Program. 
Acid rain is the result of SO2 and nitrogen oxides entering the atmosphere; the 
acids can then travel hundreds of miles from their origins.
1
 SO2 is the primary contributor 
to acid rain in North America, and two-thirds of those emissions come from coal-fired 
power plants. Acid rain causes damage to the environment and society in several ways. 
The first is that it increases the acidity of ponds, lakes, streams, and other bodies of water. 
This can decrease fish populations, wipe out entire aquatic species, and reduce 
biodiversity. By the late 1980s, over 650 lakes in the United States could support only 
acid-tolerant largemouth bass. In one New Hampshire pond, the pH level in 1980 was 
over 30 times the level it was in 1948 (Gruber, p. 144). Another harmful effect of acid 
rain is forest erosion; it can injure or even kill many different types of trees, and it 
degrades the soil, lowering agricultural productivity. Acid rain also damages property. It 
can ruin paint, corrode metals, and deteriorate stone. In 1985, the U.S. government 
estimated that acid-rain damage costs about $5 billion annually (Gruber, p. 146). The 
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emitted particulates also reduce visibility. In fact, “sulfate particles account for 50 to 70% 
of the visibility reduction in the eastern part of the United States” (Gruber, p. 146). 
Finally, these same particulates can be inhaled into the lungs and may cause illness or 
premature death due to heart or lung complications. 
Because of these harmful effects, many people may think that the optimal level of 
pollution is zero. However, the elimination of all pollution is neither possible nor 
necessarily desirable. The present day economy requires that some pollution exists. For 
example, air pollution could be reduced by eliminating all automobile usage, but this 
would lead to longer travel times, higher transportation costs, higher product prices, and 
even different types of pollution. A change such as this would fundamentally alter our 
very way of life. Paper mills could also be shut down in order to reduce water pollution, 
but the lack of paper would also drastically change the way we live our lives. Many other 
examples like these exist, and thus it can be concluded that, unless we want to make these 
changes, the optimal level of pollution is not zero. Indeed, as long as the pollution-
producing product has value to society, a zero-production level would be economically 
inefficient. 
If not zero, then what is the optimal level of pollution? Using the marginal 
principle, it can be determined that the pollution level should be at the point where the 
marginal benefit of abatement equals the marginal cost. The costs of abatement can be 
determined. Resources such as labor, capital, and land are needed to reduce pollution, and 
these cost society money. Many benefits exist to cutting pollution as well. Better health, 
and thus lower health-care costs, can be achieved with cleaner air and water. Some firms, 
such as farming companies, may have lower production costs when there is clean water. 
3 
Also, many people gain utility from a cleaner environment; this can be anything from 
enjoying a scenic view without smog to being able to swim or boat in an unpolluted lake. 
However, because firms often have no incentive to reduce their emissions on their own, 
there will be no abatement, and thus the markets for pollution-producing goods will fail 
to be efficient. 
In order to correct this market failure, the government must step into the picture.
2
 
In the United States, regulation concerning SO2 emissions first began with the 1970 
Clean Air Act which limited the atmospheric concentration levels of SO2 (Gruber, pp. 
146-147). It set New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for all new coal-fired power 
plants which made them reduce emissions by using low-sulfur coal or by installing 
scrubbers which remove much of the pollutants from the exhaust fumes. Furthermore, in 
1977, scrubbers were required on new plants making the building of new plants even 
more expensive. This method of regulation resulted in total SO2 emissions falling by the 
early 1980s; however, the older and dirtier plants which were not subject to the NSPS 
continued to pollute. Because these requirements only affected the new plants, there were 
large incentives to run the older plants past their natural lifetimes to bypass the 
regulation. 
According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2008), these loopholes 
led Congress to pass the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act. Title IV aimed to 
reduce SO2 emissions each year by 10 million tons under the 1980 levels. It created two 
phases of tightened restrictions in order to accomplish this goal. Phase I, which began in 
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 In some cases, the Coase Theorem may apply whereby the government assigns property rights for the 
common resource. However, the success of the Coase Theorem requires that bargaining costs are low. 
Since there are many participants in the energy market, the Coase Theorem is not useful for controlling SO2 
emissions by coal burning power plants. 
4 
1995, only affected the 263 dirtiest plants; however, there were 182 additional plants 
which were used as “compensating plants” that joined the program. Firms were allowed 
to reduce emissions at these plants instead of at the regulated heavy-polluting plants. 
Thus, the total number of affected plants was 445. In 2000, Phase II began; the prior 
restrictions on the dirty plants were tightened, and the program included nearly all fuel-
burning power plants. This increased the total number of affected plants to over 2,000. 
By including the majority of plants, the government was able to prevent them from 
avoiding pollution regulation. 
Furthermore, the EPA indicates that in addition to the goal of reducing SO2 
emissions, the government also wanted to minimize compliance costs and encourage the 
development of energy efficient technologies. To achieve this, the government included 
several important features in the program. The introduction of an allowance trading 
system was crucial. A single allowance lets a plant pollute one ton of SO2 during the year 
it was issued or in the future. If a plant holds on to an allowance for future use, this is 
referred to as “banking” the allowance. There is no limit on the number of allowances or 
length of time that firms are allowed to bank, and they may use their banked allowances 
at any time. However, no plant can emit at levels that exceed the limit for maximum 
atmospheric concentrations of SO2 set by Title I even if it possess the necessary number 
of allowances. Once a ton has been emitted, an allowance is retired. The government 
issues, rather than sells, the allowances to the affected plants based on historic fuel use 
and a particular emissions rate. The number of allowances is capped at 8.95 million per 
year which ensures that the emissions reduction will be achieved (EPA). The distribution 
system tends to favor older plants with regards to the number of allowances they receive. 
5 
Once the allowances have been distributed, they can be bought, sold, or banked 
for future use. All parties are allowed to buy and sell allowances including the general 
public. In fact, some groups have purchased allowances solely for the purpose of taking 
them out of the market in order to reduce pollution. The EPA even has an electronic 
tracking system to keep tally of the allowances. By implementing a trading system, the 
government allows the affected plants to base their abatement decisions on their marginal 
costs of abatement making the program more cost effective (which I discuss in greater 
detail below). 
In addition to the trading system, the EPA holds an auction for allowances once 
each year at the end of March. Anyone is able to participate in the bidding including the 
power plants, brokers, environmental groups, or anybody else wanting to buy allowances. 
Only a limited number are auctioned off (2.8% of the year’s total allowance allocation), 
and the winners can use the allowances that year. Also, parties in possession of 
allowances may offer them to be sold at the auction. Bidders submit forms detailing the 
number of allowances they want and the price they are willing to pay for them. Thus, the 
allowances are sold to the highest bidders.
3
 Having the auctions helps to send a price 
signal for allowances, and it gives the utilities another opportunity to obtain allowances 
they may need. The first auction in 1993 resulted in a price of $131, which was half of 
the expected price of $250, but it was actually a good predictor of Phase I prices 
(Ellerman and Montero, p. 60). The EPA also had a “direct sale” feature in which 
allowances could be purchased at a fixed price of $1,500 adjusted for inflation. It was 
intended to allow the utility companies to build new power plants with the assurance that 
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they would be able to obtain the necessary allowances for the new plants, but it was 
eliminated in 1997 because it turned out to be unnecessary. 
Because of the market for allowances and the different ways to obtain them, there 
is bound to be some variation in their price. Since the supply of allowances is fixed, the 
price is determined by the demand, and this is determined by the demand for electricity, 
the relative prices of fuels of differing sulfur content, the cost of scrubbing, and non-Title 
IV regulatory requirements affecting SO2 emissions (Ellerman and Montero, 2007, p. 57). 
For example, if the demand for electricity increases, the price of low-sulfur coal becomes 
relatively more expensive, scrubbing becomes more costly, or regulatory requirements 
become stricter, then the demand for allowances will increase, thus increasing the price 
of allowances. Expectations about future prices can lead firms to bank allowances, 
reducing the supply of allowances, and thereby increasing the current price of allowances 
as well. 
Over time, there has been a wide variation in the price of permits, which can be 
seen in Figure 1.1. As mentioned earlier, Phase I prices were fairly close to the first 
auction price of $131. The all-time low of under $70 occurred in 1996. This was largely 
due to the realization that SO2 emissions were much lower at the affected plants than had 
been expected, which reduced the demand for allowances (Ellerman and Montero, pp. 
60-61). The record high of just under $1600 in 1996 was the result of the Clear Air 
Interstate Rule which would lower the SO2 cap by two-thirds starting in 2010 (Ellerman 
and Montero, p. 49). This obviously worried the utility companies that feared they would 
not be able to reduce their emissions by the necessary amount. Demand for allowances 
7 
drastically increased and the price subsequently skyrocketed. As the utilities were able to 
cope with the new cap expectation, the price fell to the typical sub-$200 level.  
As detailed by the EPA, each plant must measure its emissions of various 
pollutants. A continuous emission monitoring (CEM) system is generally required, and 
the sources report hourly data to the EPA every quarter. The monitoring is a crucial 
component of the programs as it ensures that the goals are met and allows the market to 
properly price the allowances. At the end of the year, if a plant does not have the 
necessary allowances for its emissions, there is a penalty of $2,000 adjusted for inflation 
(base year 1990) for each extra ton of SO2 it emits. Violating plants must also offset the 
excess SO2 emissions with the appropriate number of allowances by having that number 
of allowances deducted from the coming year’s allotment or by setting up some other 
plan to make up for the violation. 
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
economic theory pertinent to understanding the relative cost effectiveness of a cap-and-
trade system. It discusses different methods of pollution control: quantity regulation, 
technology mandates, taxation, and emissions restrictions with tradable permits. This is 
followed by a review of the empirical research on the economic efficiency and impacts of 
the U.S. Acid Rain Program. The final section concludes this report. 
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2. Economic Theory of Pollution-Reduction Methods
4
 
Governments have several policy options available to them to reduce pollution, 
and each may be appropriate in different situations. This chapter discusses the economic 
theory behind each method and its implications for consumer surplus, producer surplus 
and efficiency. It is also important to note that governments can regulate two different 
markets. The first and more common is the market for a good; in the case of the Acid 
Rain Program, it would be the market for electricity. The second, and perhaps more 
useful, is the market for pollution reduction. The market a government chooses to 
regulate can have a distinct economic impact. 
Quantity Regulation: Quantity Restriction vs. Emission Restriction 
The first policy method of pollution control is to directly limit the amount of 
pollutants each utility is allowed to emit. This can be done with a restriction on the plant's 
production level of the good (production restriction), electricity, or a restriction on the 
plant's emissions level (emissions restriction). New technology makes plant-specific 
emissions restrictions possible. As we will see, emissions restrictions will be more cost 
effective than production restrictions. 
If the government chooses to regulate the goods market, i.e., a production 
restriction, it will specify the total quantity of production allowed for each of the power 
plants. Production levels will be restricted in order to reduce emissions. The quantity 
each plant is allowed to produce may be based on the average emissions produced in the 
industry. To achieve efficiency, regulators will mandate a production level where 
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SMC=SMB.
5
 In general, the use of quantity restrictions in an otherwise competitive 
market means that the producers are made better off because they are able to receive a 
higher price per unit when production is reduced. Conversely, consumers of the good are 
worse off due to the quantity restriction because they are consuming less of the good and 
have to pay a higher price for it. This is illustrated in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. Figure 2.1 
illustrates the market outcome. Figure 2.2 illustrates the quantity restriction which 
equates SMC with SMB.
6
 We see that the quantity restriction transfers surplus from 
consumers to producers. The area of triangle ABC is the lost surplus due to the 
restriction; however, it is more than offset by the value of the pollution reduction due to 
the regulation.
7
 Even though consumers are made worse off, if the socially optimal level 
of production is correctly estimated, then society as a whole will be better off. Note that a 
production restriction does not allow the firms flexibility in choosing how to abate. 
Moreover, a production restriction does not give firms incentive to find innovative and 
least-cost ways to abate. 
Alternatively, the government can regulate emissions. However, although more 
cost-effective than a production restriction, an emissions restriction will not be cost 
effective in general. To see why, consider the following. If the government chooses to 
establish a market for pollution reduction, then it specifies the total amount of allowable 
pollution and then divides this amount, possibly equally, between all of the power plants. 
For this to be possible, it must monitor the emissions at each plant. It also may specify 
                                                 
5
 The SMC equals the (private) marginal cost (PMC) plus the marginal external damage of the production 
process. When negative externalities are present the SMC exceeds the PMC and markets generate too much 
of the good to be socially efficient. 
6
 In this case, the private marginal benefit (PMB) equals SMB because we assume there are no positive 
externalities associated with electricity production. 
7
 The benefit to society of the regulation can be calculated as the vertical distance AC times the change in 
Q. The area of this rectangle exceeds the lost CS + PS (area of triangle ABC). 
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which technologies the plants are allowed to use. To illustrate this case, I will use 
Gruber’s example (pp. 133-138) and Figure 2.3. Total pollution is at 400 units prior to the 
government intervention. The marginal external damage (MD) of each unit of pollution is 
$100 which equals the benefit to society for each unit abated. Suppose that the 
government wants to reduce pollution by 200 units, and that there are two power plants, 
A and B, with differing marginal cost of abatement (MC) curves. The government could 
adopt a policy of equal emissions reduction across plants and require that both plants 
reduce emissions by 100 units each.  
This approach of equal emission reduction across plants will not be the least-cost 
method to reduce pollution. It would be more efficient for Plant A to reduce pollution 
more because it can do so more cheaply than Plant B. The socially optimal level for each 
plant occurs where each plant’s MC of abatement intersects the MD curve; this is also 
where the total marginal cost of abatement curve (MCT), the horizontal sum of both 
plants’ MC of abatement, intersects the MD curve. Based on differing costs of abatement, 
Plant A should reduce emissions by 150 units and Plant B by 50 units in order to 
minimize the total costs of abatement. Thus, the total cost of abating 200 units of 
pollution will be lower than if each plant has to reduce emissions by 100 units. However, 
the government cannot know the each plants' MC of abatement. Thus, with a quantity 
restriction on emissions, the best the government can do is mandate emission reductions 
based on something other than the plant’s MC of abatement.8 As we will see, a policy of 
plant-level emissions restrictions will not be as cost effective as either an emissions tax or 
a policy that sets a target pollution level for the industry and allows plants flexibility in 
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how to meet it. A tradable pollution permits system, as I discuss below, allows such 
flexibility. 
Technology Mandate 
The 1970 Clean Air Act instituted a technology mandate for newly constructed 
coal-burning power plants. This type of regulation is known as command-and-control. In 
general, such a mandate will be a costly way to reduce pollution for two reasons. First, a 
technology which is efficient for one plant may not be for another. Second, this policy 
eliminates the incentive to create better abatement technologies because there would be 
no benefit to using them. Thus, because of the inefficient use of technology, production 
costs will be higher relative to other policy approaches. Although this method may be 
simple, it is unlikely to be the best policy choice for a government wanting to reduce 
pollution at minimal cost to society.  
Taxation: Commodity Tax vs. Emissions Tax 
The next option for the government to limit pollution is through a corrective tax, 
also known as a Pigouvian tax. This method forces firms to internalize the cost of the 
damage caused by the pollution, thus resulting in the socially optimal level of pollution 
(bringing SMC and SMB into alignment). Figure 2.4 shows the situation in which the 
government places a per-unit tax on each good produced (commodity tax). This shifts the 
supply curve upward by the amount of the tax because the marginal cost of each good has 
increased. The price of the good increases and the quantity produced decreases. The 
consumer surplus falls and the impact on consumers is equivalent to the case of a 
production restriction. However, this time producer surplus falls as well because part of 
12 
the high product price has to be remitted to the government as tax revenue. For this 
reason, producers are better off if the government uses a production restriction over a 
commodity tax since PS is higher with the production restriction. This commodity tax has 
the same drawbacks as a production restriction, in that it does not encourage firms to seek 
low-cost abatement methods. 
Alternatively, the government could tax emissions directly. Using Gruber’s 
example for a second time, referring to Figure 2.3, the tax will be set equal to the 
marginal damage at $100 as before.  The plants will abate pollution when the cost of 
abatement is less than the tax. For Plant A, reducing pollution costs less than $100 for all 
units abated up to 150 units. Thus it reduces its emissions by 150 units and pays the tax 
on the 50 units it does emit. Plant B, on the other hand, will reduce pollution by 50 units 
and pollute 150 units. This method is likely to be more cost effective than a tax on the 
production of electricity because it allows firms to choose the amount of abatement based 
on their marginal cost of abatement. Because it is more cost effective than a tax on the 
goods market, a tax on emissions may result in a lower price and thus more CS than a tax 
on the goods produced. 
Rather than a tax on plant-specific emissions, heavy polluting plants would rather 
have a tax on the good which could be based on the industry’s average emissions rate; 
this is because their emissions rate is higher than the average. Low polluting plants, on 
the other hand, would prefer a tax on plant-specific emissions because their emissions 
rate is lower than the average, rather than paying the higher "industry-average" rate. 
Plants that are in the middle ground are indifferent and would pay the same amount in 
taxes either way. 
13 
The greatest advantage of using a corrective tax on emissions over either a 
production restriction, emissions restriction, or a commodity tax is that it lets the plants 
choose how much pollution to abate based on their marginal cost of abatement. 
Moreover, with a tax on emissions, plants begin to switch to cleaner technologies or use 
low-sulfur coal in order to reduce the amount of taxes they pay. The government also has 
an additional source of revenue from the tax. A drawback of using an emissions tax rather 
than the other four methods so far discussed is that the amount plants abate is more 
uncertain. Thus the actual amount of pollution is uncertain under an emissions tax 
because it is based on the plants’ abatement decisions. 
Emissions Restrictions with Tradable Permits 
The use of marketable pollution permits or allowances to control emissions is a 
relatively new innovation. The government sets a target pollution level for the industry, 
issues enough permits to meet this target, and allows firms to trade these permits. This is 
also referred to as a cap-and-trade system. Allowing the trading of the permits can be 
beneficial for both parties. Firms with low abatement costs will sell their permits for a 
higher price than what it costs them to reduce their emissions while firms with high 
abatement costs will buy permits for a lower price than what it costs them to reduce their 
emissions. Using Gruber’s example again, referring to Figure 2.3, suppose the 
government gives each plant 100 permits, each one allowing one unit of pollution. 
Without trading, each plant would be allowed to pollute 100 units
9
. However, once 
trading is introduced, both plants can be made better off. The MC of reducing pollution 
by 100 units is much higher for Plant B, and thus it has an incentive to buy permits from 
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Plant A. As long as the price is above its MC of abatement, Plant A will agree to this 
trade. Trading will occur until Plant A is reducing its pollution by 150 units, and Plant B 
by 50 units; at this point the MC of abatement for both plants will be at $100, the socially 
optimal level of pollution. Thus, this system is able to take advantage of the differences 
in abatement costs between the different plants to minimize the total abatement costs. 
Tradable permits allow plants to abate according to their MC of abatement. As 
discussed above, a Pigouvian emissions tax does the same. Because of this, both an 
allowance system and an emission tax generate lower compliance costs; therefore, the 
product price will be lower under these policy instruments than if the other methods are 
used. This would increase consumer surplus under an allowance system or emissions tax 
relative to the other methods. The producer surplus situation is slightly more complicated 
and depends on permit prices. For example, heavy-polluting plants prefer a permit system 
to an emissions tax as long as the permit price times the number of permits needed is less 
than the taxes that would be owed, which would equal the tax rate times total plant 
emissions. 
Because there are a fixed number of permits, the supply curve is vertical; thus the 
level of demand for permits determines their price. If the government wants to lower the 
emissions cap, they can reduce the number of permits over time causing the supply curve 
to shift to the left. This results in a higher price for the permits; more plants increase their 
abatement efforts due to the higher price causing total emissions to fall. If plants are able 
to develop more efficient technologies which allow them to reduce their cost of 
abatement, then the demand curve for permits will shift to the left resulting in a lower 
permit price. Thus, unlike with quantity regulation, technology mandates, or commodity 
15 
taxes, there are incentives to develop more efficient technology under an allowance 
system just like there are under a Pigouvian emissions tax. 
The greatest advantage of either a cap-and-trade system or an emissions tax is that 
it “allows sources to select their own compliance strategy. For example, to reduce SO2 an 
affected source may repower its plants, use cleaner burning fuel, or reassign some of its 
energy production capacity from dirtier plants to cleaner ones. Sources also may decide 
to reduce electricity generation by adopting conservation or efficiency measures. Most 
options, like fuel switching, require no special prior approval, allowing the source to 
respond quickly to market conditions without needing government approval” (EPA, 
Basic Information). Other advantages are that regulators need less information than with 
quantity restrictions, technology mandates, or commodity taxes, and regulators can be 
certain of the pollution level because the government sets it itself. 
Finally, one possible disadvantage of the tradable-permit system is that it can 
create pockets of pollution. This would occur if heavy-polluting plants, whose abatement 
costs are high, purchase allowances from newer, cleaner plants, whose abatement costs 
are low. As a result, the heavy-polluting plants continue to pollute at high levels creating 
areas with large amounts of pollution, known as hotspots.
10
 Note that hotspots similarly 
can arise with emissions taxes. Heavy polluting plants with high abatement costs will pay 
the tax and continue to pollute; firms with lower MC of abatement will reduce pollution 
to avoid the tax. This simplified analysis of the way in which a tradeable permit system 
works ignores the role that banking plays in impacting emissions abatement. I discuss the 
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implications of banking for the cost effectiveness of permit markets below in the review 
of Ellerman and Montero (2007). 
3. Economic Literature on the Acid Rain Program 
Ellerman and Montero(2007) 
Ellerman and Montero examine the efficiency of banking allowances in the U.S. 
Acid Rain Program by developing a model of efficient banking and using the first eight 
years of data. They also identify erroneous assumptions in the earlier views as well as the 
necessary conditions for efficient banking to exist independently of changes in the 
counterfactual (estimates for the emissions that would have occurred without the cap). 
The authors claim that the two-phase feature in the Acid Rain Program is very 
significant. In Phase I, the “big dirties” were subject to an emission cap whereas in Phase 
II, nearly all coal-burning power plants were subject to the cap. This cap became stricter 
in the second phase as well, but compliance was about twice the required level. Because 
the marginal cost of abatement in Phase II was higher, there was incentive for the plants 
to bank their allowances; in fact, 30% of the allotted allowances were banked during 
Phase I. Over 1/3 of these banked allowances were used in the first three years of Phase 
II. Thus, many analysts believed that there was too much banking in Phase I. 
However, Ellerman and Montero argue that "this misperception has been due to 1) 
a failure to understand how an initial error in expectation concerning counterfactual 
emissions affects banking behavior and 2) an assumption of greater irreversibility in 
abatement at the beginning of Phase 1 than seems in retrospect to have been the case” (p. 
49). They are also able to show that, in general, efficient banking will be robust. In other 
17 
words, it will not be affected much by changes in the level of the counterfactual or the 
total abatement required by the cap. They use the data through 2002 ignoring 2003-2006 
because of the disruption in the market caused by the announcement of the Clean Air 
Interstate Rule which would lower the SO2 cap by two-thirds. 
A permit-banking model with no uncertainty and perfect competition results in 
permit prices rising by the risk-free interest rate. However, firms do not know how many 
permits they will need in the future, so the equilibrium price of permits becomes an 
uncertain variable. Because of this uncertainty, holding permits and investing in 
abatement are no longer risk-free activities. In order to minimize their compliance costs, 
risk-adverse firms will diversify their portfolios, which will include permits. Efficient 
banking requires that firms set their marginal abatement cost to the price of permits at 
each point in time. Another condition is that the total number of allowances equals total 
emissions throughout the banking period. At the end of this period, the amount of 
abatement will equal the difference between the cap and the counterfactual. Combining 
these conditions, the authors are able to obtain the expected abatement in each period as a 
function of abatement at the end of the banking period, and then they can derive efficient 
banking paths. The model can be adapted to changes in agents’ expectations and changes 
in parameter values during the banking period. 
The authors next list the parameter values they used in their model. The allowance 
cap for Phase I was 7.62 million allowances while the initial counterfactual emissions 
was 9.07 million tons of SO2. The cap for Phase II was 9.39 million allowances while the 
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counterfactual emissions was 15.79 million tons of SO2.
11
 Even though the demand for 
electricity was expected to grow between 1.5-2.5% per year, the expectations for the 
counterfactual emissions varied widely. High estimates predicted emissions growth of 
1.25% per year, and low estimates predicted constant emissions or a decline of 0.5-1.0% 
per year. The authors split the high and low estimates and use 0.65% for the annual 
growth in the counterfactual emissions. They assume a linear relationship between the 
quantity and the marginal cost of abatement. Because allowance prices will be equal to 
the marginal cost, the price path will depend on the discount rate. High rates lead to 
shorter banking periods, lower initial prices, and greater increases in marginal abatement 
cost during the banking period. After the banking period, prices for allowances increase 
at a lower rate. The authors find that there is no undiversifiable risk due to holding 
allowances so the risk-free rate is the most appropriate discount rate; this is estimated to 
be about 3.5% during Phase I. 
The actual allowance banking closely follows the path predicted by Ellerman and 
Montero. It follows a path according to a discount rate of 4% and a growth rate of 
counterfactual emissions of 0.65%.  The banking follows an optimal path given these two 
values. However, in 2000 the actual banking path diverges from the path using constant 
parameters. The real discount rate fell from 4% in 2000 to 2.75% in 2002. This partially 
explains the change but cannot solely justify the decline in the draw-down rate, the rate at 
which banked allowances were used. The most likely explanation is that the expected 
growth in counterfactual emissions changed. This is likely to be the case because the 
                                                 
11
Phase II counterfactual emissions includes the projected emissions of all regulated plants whereas Phase I 
counterfactual emissions includes the initially affected plants. This is the reason for the large increase in 
counterfactual emissions from Phase I to Phase II. 
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growth in electricity demand in the 1990s was higher than expected, natural gas prices 
were high in 2000-2001, and Congress was considering lowering the SO2 cap by two-
thirds. All of these would cause future allowance prices to be higher. 
As mentioned earlier in the introduction of this report, the first EPA auction in 
March 1993 resulted in an allowance price of $131; this was about half the price of the 
trades occurring at the time ($250-$300). The expected Phase I price was $250; however, 
this auction price was a good predictor of actual Phase I prices. SO2 emissions in the 
Midwest fell in part as a result of the deregulation of the railroads in the 1980s.
12
 Because 
emissions were so much lower than expected, allowance prices fell even more to an all-
time low just under $70 in 1996. Nearly half the abatement in early Phase I was due to 
the installation of scrubbers, which is capital-intensive, requires significant lead-time, and 
is irreversible for long periods. Also, multi-year contracts for low-sulfur coal were signed 
to get around the expected price increase of this coal once the U.S. Acid Rain Program 
started; these contracts also contributed to irreversibility by limiting power plants to 
switch back to high-sulfur coal when the higher prices did not occur. 
It was the combination of the low levels of counterfactual emissions and the 
appearance of significant irreversibility that led many people to believe that there was too 
much banking of allowances. However, using their model, the authors are able to make 
predictions with varying levels of initial counterfactual emissions. They use a range of 
+20% to -20% and assume complete reversibility of abatement techniques. The initial 
price and quantity of abatement fall sharply with lower levels of initial counterfactual 
                                                 
12
 Because demand for low-sulfur coal was growing, Union Pacific built tracks in the Powder River Basin, 
which was previously monopolized by Burlington Northern Sante Fe, thus creating competition for the 
transportation of this coal. Without the deregulation, this would not have been possible. 
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emissions, but the amount of banking and the predicted initial emissions barely change at 
all. Errors in expectation of the counterfactual lead to changes in current abatement rather 
than banking of allowances.  
Because the authors have found banking to be efficient, they conclude that 
sufficient reversibility must have existed. Switching to low-sulfur coal, the abatement 
technique having the most reversibility and requiring the least lead time, rose by about 
63% while scrubbing increased just slightly. Some of the abatement by switching fuel 
types is presumed to have been canceled or reversed as prices fell, but as prices began to 
rise again, the cancelled abatement was restored. 
Ellerman and Montero concluded that the banking of allowances was rather 
efficient. The program shows that properly constructed markets produce favorable 
results. This efficiency was surprising because many experts, including the authors 
themselves in their previous work, believed banking to be excessive. Banking was 
relatively robust, and the irreversibility in certain abatement decisions was not enough to 
prevent abatement reduction approximately equal to the error in expected initial 
counterfactual emissions. However, this did have a cost that showed up in the choice of 
abatement technique; there was less switching to low sulfur coal during Phase I than 
would have been optimal.  
The authors discovered several implications. The correlation of the returns from 
holding allowances with those from having a diversified portfolio of equities is low or 
even zero. Thus the discount rate will be low and the role of banking is important 
compared to a case in which the discount rate is high. Next, changes in counterfactual 
emissions have a stronger impact on abatement and allowance prices than banking 
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practices. Finally, in cap-and-trade programs, banking will increase abatement and 
allowance prices during the early phases because of voluntary action. Although there 
were some agents whose behavior was inefficient, they did not have a big impact on the 
system. The U.S. Acid Rain Program cannot be said to be efficient in every sense but has 
shown that its participants most often act in rational ways.  There was also fear that 
emissions would spike as plants use all of their banked allowances as once, thus creating 
unpredictable variations in emission levels. Some years could have low emissions as 
many allowances are banked while other years would have high levels of emissions as 
those allowances are used. However, the evidence does not support this fear. 
Schmalensee, Joskow, Ellerman, Montero and Bailey (1998) 
Schmalensee et al. examine the compliance costs and allowance market 
performance under the U.S. Acid Rain Program and the early lessons learned from it. 
After the authors describe how the program works, which I have already done in Chapter 
1, they then explain what happened to SO2 emissions. The data used comes from the 
EPA’s National Allowance Data Base, Supplemental Data File, Allowance Tracking 
System, and Emissions Monitoring System. Total SO2 emissions fell considerably 
between 1990 and 1994; about 80% of this decline was due to the larger market area of 
the Powder River Basin. The deregulation of the railroads and entry of United Pacific 
resulted in a decline of rail rates thus expanding this market’s size. Emissions also fell 
sharply in 1995 and were much lower than the allowances issued. Emissions remained 
lower than the allowances in 1996 as well. There are several possible reasons for the 
overcompliance. First, allowance prices are expected to be higher in Phase II than in 
Phase I, thus it may be efficient to save some allowances for future use. The other 
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possibility is that the market did not foresee the rail rate declines, and thus they 
overinvested in scrubbers and made long-term contracts for more low-sulfur coal than 
needed. Another reason for the dramatic decline in emissions was that a large number of 
volunteer plants joined the program and reduced their emission levels. Some did this to 
substitute for the higher cost, dirty plants (known as Table A plants), while others did it 
in order to be compensated with allowances or to be exempt from NOx regulation. 
Next Schmalensee et al. discuss how the emissions were reduced. They first 
compute the counterfactual emissions which were calculated by taking the product of 
1993 emission rates times the fuel heat input, measured in lb/MMBtu (pounds per million 
British thermal units), in 1996. The counterfactual measures what emissions would have 
been in 1996 if the fuel usage was the same in 1996 as in 1993. Because the estimated 
counterfactual emissions were above the 1993 emissions rate, it is clear that compliance 
was not obtained by a decline in the plants’ use, i.e., cutting production. The utilization of 
scrubbers by 27 plants accounted for 45% of the emissions reduction while switching, 
mostly to lower-sulfur coal, accounted for the other 55%. Table A plants accounted for at 
least 95% of the emissions reduction in both years. 
The authors then examine what occurred in the allowance market. The pricing 
data comes from trade press reports, price indices from the Emissions Exchange, 
Fieldston, and Cantor Fitzgerald, and the EPA’s annual auction. The EPA reported the 
allocation of allowances in 1992 so that early trading could occur. This created 
information on what the price of an allowance should be. Early trading occurred at $300 
and $265 per allowance which was expected. However, the 1993 EPA auction resulted in 
a price of $131; this was thought to be an abnormality, but the 1994 auction had a similar 
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result. Shortly after, the rest of the market moved towards that price. The market also 
appeared to develop rather efficiently in that one price was emerging without the 
presence of speculative bubbles: millions of allowances were privately traded, and the 
average winning bids in the auctions converged towards the lowest winning bids as time 
progressed. 
Schmalensee et al. then briefly discuss the costs of compliance. The cost of 
reducing emissions by 3.9 million tons in 1995 was approximately $726 million or about 
$187 per ton. This is on the lower end of the early cost estimates. They estimate a savings 
of 25-34% compared to a system with the same number of allowances but with no 
trading. Finally, the authors explain the lessons learned. The Acid Rain Program has 
achieved the emissions goal on time, without much litigation, and has cost less than 
expected. This is partially due to the lower rail rates, but this still remains a big 
accomplishment for an environmental program. It shows that tradable-permit programs 
can work the way theory predicts, and that they can adapt to other economic forces. Also, 
efficient markets for the allowances take time to mature. However, despite the short-term 
success of the U.S. Acid Rain Program, tradable-permit programs are not suited for every 
situation, and many factors must be properly executed for them to work. 
Ludwig (2004) 
Ludwig examines whether the permit-trading feature of the Acid Rain Program 
has a strong impact on SO2 emissions and thus whether this feature is a cause of pollution 
hotspots. After discussing how permit-trading programs function and the details of the 
Acid Rain Program, she briefly describes the findings of Swift (2000) on hotspots. He 
gives several reasons why trading will have little effect on hotspots. First, the program 
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has air quality standards that would prevent hot spots from occurring. Second, other 
factors like plant location, plant size, and fuel utilization are more important contributors 
to hotspots than trading. Swift also found that regions had total emissions between 64-
77% of their permits issued, meaning that some of the permits were banked, and that “81 
percent of permits used to offset emissions come from within the state.” This means that 
there were not large numbers of permits moving to just a few destinations and causing 
hotspots; rather, his findings suggest that trading may actually prevent hotspots 
altogether. 
Ludwig investigates the impact of net permit flows to a plant on the plant’s 
emissions level using cross-sectional plant-level data in 2002. Net permit flows (PNET) 
in 2002 are calculated as net permit purchases: the total number purchased minus the total 
number sold in 2002. Plants with a high PNET ought to have a high emissions level, 
unless the plant is buying the permits to bank them for future use.  
Ludwig uses a traditional linear regression and Ordinary Least Squares analysis. 
Her model uses SO2 emission levels as the dependent variable and plant size, primary 
fuel type, SO2 controls, and net flow of permits as the explanatory variables. SO2 
emissions were only taken from active participants in the program, and they are measured 
in tons per year. Heat input is used as a proxy for plant size and is the product of the 
quantity of fuel used and the fuel’s heat content. Its coefficient is expected to be positive 
because larger plants emit more SO2. A dummy variable is used for fuel type where the 
primary use of coal is assigned a value of 1; all other fuel types are assigned a value of 0. 
This coefficient is also expected to be positive because coal has higher sulfur content than 
the other fuel types. A dummy is also used for SO2 controls. Plants that have some sort of 
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control have a value of 1, and ones that do not have a value of 0. Controls reduce 
emissions so this coefficient is expected to be negative. She uses data from 2002, the 
most recent year at the time, which came from the EPA’s website.  
In her regression results, Ludwig finds all of the coefficients to have the expected 
signs, and all of the variables were significant at the 99% confidence level. She finds the 
coefficient for net permit inflow to be 0.06 meaning that, ceteris paribus, each additional 
permit above a balance of zero increases SO2 emissions by 0.06 tons per year. Note that 
this coefficient is significantly less than on 1, so that one permit bought on net increases 
SO2 emissions by far less than one ton. Rather, the other explanatory variables such as 
plant size and fuel type appear to be more important in explaining emissions levels. 
However, this result may be an artifact of the year 2002: impending legislation proposed 
lowering the SO2 cap by two-thirds, leading firms to bank. Running this model for a year 
in the 1990s prior to the announcement of this legislation may have different results. 
Ludwig then tests for potential econometric problems. She finds that 
multicollinearity is not a problem within her model, but heteroskedasticity is. The 
coefficients remain unbiased, but the t-statistics and F-statistics cannot be trusted because 
the variances and standard errors are underestimated. Although she does not do so, the 
heteroskedasticity problem can be eliminated by using robust standard errors. Note that a 
correction could change the level of significance for PNET from significant to 
insignificant, which would further support her conclusion that PNET has little impact on 
SO2 emissions. In light of her results, Ludwig concludes that hotspots should no longer 
prevent policymakers from using permits trading systems. She suggests that incentive 
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based programs, like the Acid Rain Program, be used not only for environmental policy, 
but for a multitude of policies. 
Tietenberg (2003) 
Tietenberg examines the experiences of programs using tradable permits, 
primarily ones involving air-pollution control, water supply, and fisheries management. 
His goal is to draw some conclusions from these experiences to provide insight on how to 
implement tradable-permit programs resulting from the Kyoto Protocol. The author 
reports that the use of tradable-permit programs is becoming more prevalent when it 
comes to limiting access to the “commons” by which he means public goods such as the 
atmosphere, fish populations, and the wetlands. The reason for this is that typical 
command-and-control regulations do not sufficiently protect the value of the resources 
being used. The Kyoto Protocol will expand their use even further using three 
mechanisms: emissions trading (allows trading of assigned amounts), joint 
implementation (gives emissions-reduction credit to an Annex I
13
 country when they help 
finance projects that reduce emissions in another Annex I country), and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) in which Annex I parties finance projects in non-
Annex I countries to receive emission reductions. It also appears that starting new 
tradable-permit programs becomes easier with more experience.  
Tietenberg found both successes and failures with tradable-permit programs. 
Often times, they are more cost effective than traditional policies. There have been many 
lessons learned from past experiences that can be applied to the climate change case. The 
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 Annex I countries are those listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol and primarily include developed 
countries. 
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Kyoto Protocol aims to control six greenhouse gases. Experience with multi-pollutant 
programs is limited, so while past experience can be useful and informative, it is by no 
means a sure thing. Cap-and-trade programs performed both economically and 
environmentally better than credit-trading systems
14
 because the latter have higher 
transaction costs and regulatory barriers. Monitoring and enforcement are vital to the 
success of these programs. Carbon emissions may be easy to estimate, but other 
greenhouse gases are not quite as easy to monitor. Some countries cannot monitor 
emissions as easily as other countries. There are differing degrees of enforcement 
capability among nations as well which can hinder the progress and efficiency of 
international programs. Countries with little or no enforcement could just end up selling 
their permits to countries where enforcement is much stricter. Thus monitoring and 
enforcement are much easier said than done. Other problems may arise as well. Spatial 
externalities may not be a problem for CO2 emissions, but they have been an issue for 
fisheries and water allocation and may be problematic for other greenhouse gases. 
Leakages, or the relocation of firms, either within a country or between a country that has 
signed the protocol and one that has not, could occur if the firms want to avoid 
regulation.  
Tietenberg also claims that setting the cap is a vital step, but if there is no 
consensus on what that cap should be, the goal of reducing emissions may not be 
reached. Another important requirement for success is emitters’ ability to find cost-
effective ways to reduce their emissions, but some emitters, especially those in 
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 In a credit trading system, a non-regulated plant can cut emissions below a specified level and earn credit 
for making the emissions reduction. It can then sell that credit to a regulated plant, which can use that credit 
instead of cutting its own emissions. 
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developing countries, may not be able to do this. The CDM is intended to counter this 
problem. It has been observed that over time, programs move towards fewer restrictions 
as parties become more familiar with them, but too many restrictions from the start may 
doom them to failure. Also, flexibility (i.e. allowing banking and borrowing) in the 
system is important to reduce the costs of compliance. 
The author also lists lessons for program design. The costs of monitoring, 
enforcing, and administering the system can be paid for by fees placed on each permit. 
Because monitoring in the Kyoto Protocol will involve some self-reporting, there may be 
some deception.  He suggests creating “layers of veracity checks” in order to reduce this. 
Also, trading should only be allowed between eligible parties. Eligibility is defined as 
having an approved domestic enforcement system and having been in compliance in the 
previous time period. Price information and other relevant data should also be easily 
accessible in order to make the market more transparent. Reduction obligations for future 
periods should also be made known. This would make clearer the value of investments. 
The program should be designed to account for extreme circumstances such as price 
spikes. Certain measures to prevent the price-spike problem could prevent extreme 
economic damage as a result of a severe change in circumstances. Also, joint 
implementation and the CDM must be carefully utilized as it will likely take some time 
before parties involved have enough experience with them to use them efficiently. 
Finally, Tietenberg reports that there are two expectations of economic theory that 
do not hold in reality. The first is that the main purpose of a tradable-permit system is to 
protect the value of the resource, not the resources itself. However, the strictness of the 
cap and the degree of compliance with the cap can be affected by policy. The second is 
29 
that there is a tradeoff between efficiency and equity regardless of the initial distribution 
of the permits. Theory says that trade allows the permits to move towards those who 
value them the most. However, in practice, the permits are typically given to historic 
users, and thus other means of ensuring equity are required. Therefore, these systems 
must still deal with the efficiency-equity issue. Tradable-permit programs are not right 
for every situation, but they will likely be very important when it comes to climate 
change.  
4. Conclusion 
The U.S. Acid Rain Program was a revolutionary departure from traditional 
pollution control methods. It was able to reduce SO2 emissions by more than the required 
level on time and at a lower-than-expected cost. This was an extraordinary feat that 
proved that economic theory has a place in the world other than just the classroom. 
Methods such as quantity regulation and commodity taxes have their strengths and their 
weaknesses, but in theory tradable-permit programs and taxes on emissions have the most 
efficient outcome for society. After seeing the success of the Acid Rain Program, this 
appears to be the case.  
Review of the literature seems to agree with this conclusion. Ellerman and 
Montero concluded that the banking of allowances was rather efficient and relatively 
robust. Schmalensee et al. found the compliance costs to be on the lower end of the 
expectations, and that this program was significantly less expensive than a similar 
program without trading. Ludwig found that permit trading had little effect on SO2 
emissions, and thus was not a major cause of pollution hotspots. Finally, Tietenberg 
30 
examined the experiences of cap-and-trade systems around the world and found a number 
of reasons to implement them. However, all of the authors agree that a cap-and-trade 
system may not be appropriate in all markets, and that certain measures must be taken in 
order for them to be as successful as the U.S. Acid Rain Program. By learning from the 
experiences and lessons of this program and those of similar programs around the world, 
legislators will be better prepared to implement policies that are able to reduce or even 
reverse the damage caused by pollution and obtain the environmental quality that today’s 
society so dearly values.  
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Figures 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: SO2 Allowance Trading Volume and Prices, March 1994-October 2008  
 
  
Note: Transfer volume data provided only through December 2007. 
Source EPA (transfer volume); Cantor CO2e (price), 2008. 
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Figure 2.1: Goods Market, Generates a Product Price Where PMC=PMB 
 
PMC – Private Marginal Cost 
PMB – Private Marginal Benefit 
SMB – Social Marginal Benefit 
CS – Consumer Surplus 
PS – Producer Surplus  
= PMC 
= PMB 
= SMB 
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Figure 2.2: Production Restriction.  
 
The social marginal cost (SMC) exceeds the PMC by the amount of the external 
damage. Q* is found where SMC = SMB. 
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Figure 2.3: Pollution-Reduction Market with Multiple Firms, Firms' MC and 
Society's MB of Abatement (Not Production). 
 
Source: Gruber, p. 136. 
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Figure 2.4: Commodity Tax  
 
The tax brings SMC and SMB into alignment. 
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